This article on the usefulness of a general codification of administrative law forms the closing contribution of a NALL-special. In this special, various authors have reflected on the successfulness of a broad codification process in 1998, which introduced rules on the notification of decisions, policy rules, subsidies, enforcement and supervision of administrative authorities in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (GALA). The editors asked the contributors whether the objectives of the rules introduced were met and how the rules turned out to function in practice. In this overarching article, the NALL-editors reflect on the general lessons to be learned for the GALA-legislator. In these lessons they also take into consideration the initiatives for a law of administrative procedure of the European Union.

This article examines the subsidy rules as they have developed since the introduction of the subsidy title into the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) fifteen years ago. What did experts at that time consider to be the most important parts of the subsidy title and what were their expectations in that regard? We will consider, for certain selected topics, which main developments have taken place in legal practice over the past fifteen years, based mainly on an analysis of the case law. The most important features and trends will be outlined in this article. Finally, we will consider whether these features and trends can teach us anything about (the development of) the GALA that may still be relevant for the legislator today, when designing general rules of administrative law.

In 1998 a chapter on administrative enforcement was added to the GALA (in the so-called third Tranche). This contribution reflects on the legislative aims of this Tranche; to what extent these aims have been attained and what important developments have occurred since. As the third Tranche has led to little reform, a brief review will suffice. The developments after the third Tranche are discussed extensively, concerning both the third Tranche - amongst others the obligation in principle to enforce ('beginselplicht tot handhaving') - and reparatory sanctions since the fourth Tranche (2009), which amongst others regulated the execution of administrative reparatory sanctions and added regulation on administrative fines (a punitive sanction). Additionally, more general provisions of administrative law enforcement are discussed. The development of administrative enforcement are reflected against general developments in administrative law, such as harmonization and the increase of litigation. Lastly some bottlenecks will be noticed and solutions proposed.

The legislator deliberately created a more restrained compensation duty for the legal costs made in the objection procedure, than for the costs made in the appeal procedure. According to article 7:15 of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act, solely the legal costs made in the objection procedure are reimbursed at the request of the stakeholder, as far as the contested decision is revoked by reason of the tort due to the administration. The administration decides on this request when deciding on the objection. There are several disadvantages to this. That is particularly the case, when the stakeholder has lost his interest in the revocation of the contested decision during the procedure, and he solely wants his costs, made in the objection procedure, reimbursed. This raises the question of whether it would be better to regulate the legal costs made in the objection procedure in the same way as the legal costs made in the appeal procedure.

This article examines the impact of the introduction of the Schutznorm-principle (relativiteitsvereiste) in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act on the private enforcement of state aid law. This principle prohibits the administrative courts to annul a decision if the ground manifestly does not protect the complainants interests. Court decisions are examined to research the role of individuals in the private enforcement of state aid law. These individuals often have no competitive relation with the (alleged) beneficiary of the aid. However, presumably the Schutznorm-principle will not hinder them from annulling the decision because the Schutznorm-principle requires clarity regarding the scope of the provision invoked. Article 108 TFEU lacks this clarity. Based on possibilities of appeal against Commissions decisions and case law of the EU CoJ on this matter, the author argues that not every individual needs to be able to invoke state aid provisions.

This publication discusses all aspects of causal connection between damages and unlawful governmental decisions.