In the theory, legislation and practice of regulation and conduct of administrative procedures, trends towards the concept of good administration can be detected at both supra- and national levels. Based on normative and comparative-legal analyses of Slovene (1999), Croatian (2009) and the EP Resolution (2013) administrative procedure acts (APAs), the article identifies user-oriented institutions that pursue the principles of good administration. Furthermore, it examines acceleration and braking mechanisms that influence the duration of procedures (e.g. setting and shortening time limits, positive fiction, preclusions, and enforcement of procedural errors, broader participation of affected parties, legal protection). Timely and efficient decision-making viewed as a human right with balanced protection of public and private legal interests is in fact crucial for achieving good administration. Hence, in conclusion, the authors propose selected changes de lege ferenda for the reregulation of APAs in Slovenia and beyond, in support of less excessive length of procedures.

This article on the usefulness of a general codification of administrative law forms the closing contribution of a NALL-special. In this special, various authors have reflected on the successfulness of a broad codification process in 1998, which introduced rules on the notification of decisions, policy rules, subsidies, enforcement and supervision of administrative authorities in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (GALA). The editors asked the contributors whether the objectives of the rules introduced were met and how the rules turned out to function in practice. In this overarching article, the NALL-editors reflect on the general lessons to be learned for the GALA-legislator. In these lessons they also take into consideration the initiatives for a law of administrative procedure of the European Union.

In judicial review of decisions of administrative authorities courts generally aim towards grounding a judgment on substantively true facts. Such a substantive truth is usually understood as meaning ’that which happened’. But how can true facts be established if the facts have not yet occurred and what implications does this have for judicial review in administrative procedures? In this article this question will be analysed by taking the Dutch Administrative Court’s review of merger decisions of the Dutch Competition Authority - using a substantively close copy of the European merger control assessment framework - as subject of analysis. Judicial review of the substantive assessment in merger control, including the prospective analysis involved and taking into account complexities of economic evidence, will be analyzed and set against the general aim of establishing substantive truth of facts.

In the case of Byankov the Court of Justice ruled as follows: EU law must be interpreted as precluding legislation under which an administrative procedure that has resulted in the adoption of a prohibition on leaving the territory, which has become final and has not been contested before the courts, may be reopened - in the event of the prohibition being clearly contrary to EU law - only in circumstances such as those exhaustively listed in Article 99 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, despite the fact that such a prohibition continues to produce legal effects with regard to its addressee. This study discusses how the ruling can be placed in the case law of the Court that in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, EU law does not require that administrative authorities be placed under an obligation to re-examine a national final administrative decision.

This article examines the actual application of European administrative soft law in light of the Dutch principle of legality. European administrative soft law is not legally binding. However, European administrative soft law can generate judicial binding effects for the Member States on the basis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Moreover, the research on the actual application of administratice soft law in the field of European subsidies shows that it can also have a 'de facto' binding effect for the Member Sates.

The (legal and actual) binding effects of European administrative soft law are problematic in light of the principle of legality, according to which binding norms must be laid down in hard law. The article argues that with the application of administrative soft law, three functions of the principle of legality (the principle provides legal certainty and legitimacy and serves as a safeguard against public authorities) are not sufficiently met. Several possible solutions that may resolve this tension are proposed.

This article examines the impact of the introduction of the Schutznorm-principle (relativiteitsvereiste) in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act on the private enforcement of state aid law. This principle prohibits the administrative courts to annul a decision if the ground manifestly does not protect the complainants interests. Court decisions are examined to research the role of individuals in the private enforcement of state aid law. These individuals often have no competitive relation with the (alleged) beneficiary of the aid. However, presumably the Schutznorm-principle will not hinder them from annulling the decision because the Schutznorm-principle requires clarity regarding the scope of the provision invoked. Article 108 TFEU lacks this clarity. Based on possibilities of appeal against Commissions decisions and case law of the EU CoJ on this matter, the author argues that not every individual needs to be able to invoke state aid provisions.

The central issue of this article is which European requirements apply when European and national authorities divide European grants among the applicants. Mostly, the European money which is available for awarding European grants is scarce. In this article, two questions come up for discussion. First: which distribution system has to be chosen? Second: to what extent the principles of equal treatment and transparancy – derived from the European procurement rules – are applicable to the distribution of European grants? This article will conclude that there is a difference between European grants awarded by the European Commission, European agencies and the so-called national agencies on the one hand, and European grants awarded by national authorities on the other.

The case law of the Court of Justice on revoking a national final administrative decision or judgement which is not compliant with EU law can illustrate the existing tension between the principle of primacy on the one hand, and the principle of national procedural autonomy on the other. Although the Court’s choice for one of the two principles as a starting point for solving a collision between EU law and national law may seem arbitrary at first glance, a system may be possible to a certain extent. This study discusses this system, hoping to provide a possible model of explanation which may be applicable to future case law.