This article examines the actual application of European administrative soft law in light of the Dutch principle of legality. European administrative soft law is not legally binding. However, European administrative soft law can generate judicial binding effects for the Member States on the basis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Moreover, the research on the actual application of administratice soft law in the field of European subsidies shows that it can also have a 'de facto' binding effect for the Member Sates.

The (legal and actual) binding effects of European administrative soft law are problematic in light of the principle of legality, according to which binding norms must be laid down in hard law. The article argues that with the application of administrative soft law, three functions of the principle of legality (the principle provides legal certainty and legitimacy and serves as a safeguard against public authorities) are not sufficiently met. Several possible solutions that may resolve this tension are proposed.

The central issue of this article is which European requirements apply when European and national authorities divide European grants among the applicants. Mostly, the European money which is available for awarding European grants is scarce. In this article, two questions come up for discussion. First: which distribution system has to be chosen? Second: to what extent the principles of equal treatment and transparancy – derived from the European procurement rules – are applicable to the distribution of European grants? This article will conclude that there is a difference between European grants awarded by the European Commission, European agencies and the so-called national agencies on the one hand, and European grants awarded by national authorities on the other.

The case law of the Court of Justice on revoking a national final administrative decision or judgement which is not compliant with EU law can illustrate the existing tension between the principle of primacy on the one hand, and the principle of national procedural autonomy on the other. Although the Court’s choice for one of the two principles as a starting point for solving a collision between EU law and national law may seem arbitrary at first glance, a system may be possible to a certain extent. This study discusses this system, hoping to provide a possible model of explanation which may be applicable to future case law.