The contribution assesses Germany’s better regulation system as quality assurance system. At first, the paper outlines the development of the system over the last years and describes its main characteristics. The introduction of the Nationaler Normenkontrollrat (National Regulatory Control Council) in 2006 can be seen as a cornerstone in this respect. The competency of the National Regulatory Control Council was extended in 2011 and a new concept of cost measurement of regulatory costs - compliance costs - was introduced. The new concept captures not only the costs arising from information obligations, but all compliance costs of a regulation. Secondly, the paper discusses the challenges to the better regulation system, in particular, those due to Germany’s federal structure providing in most legislative areas for a separation of actual law making at the federal level and execution of laws by the German Länder (and their municipalities).

This article on the usefulness of a general codification of administrative law forms the closing contribution of a NALL-special. In this special, various authors have reflected on the successfulness of a broad codification process in 1998, which introduced rules on the notification of decisions, policy rules, subsidies, enforcement and supervision of administrative authorities in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (GALA). The editors asked the contributors whether the objectives of the rules introduced were met and how the rules turned out to function in practice. In this overarching article, the NALL-editors reflect on the general lessons to be learned for the GALA-legislator. In these lessons they also take into consideration the initiatives for a law of administrative procedure of the European Union.

The codification of policy rules is based on the assumption that public authorities will adopt their policy in policy rules and that judges will use these policy rules when assessing individual decisions. However, codification might have side effects, like the existence of rules that do not meet the criteria of policy rules. This article examines the extent to which the objectives of the legislator have been achieved. It is concluded that public bodies indeed adopt policy rules more and more, but that these rules do not always meet the standards. Administrative courts appear to use rules when assessing decisions, but do not seem to follow the scheme as laid down in the GALA. The codification resulted in a complexity of rules, but this complexity does not hamper judicial review. After all: the judicial review is centered on the individual decision, not so much on the nature of the applied rule.

In 1998 a chapter on administrative enforcement was added to the GALA (in the so-called third Tranche). This contribution reflects on the legislative aims of this Tranche; to what extent these aims have been attained and what important developments have occurred since. As the third Tranche has led to little reform, a brief review will suffice. The developments after the third Tranche are discussed extensively, concerning both the third Tranche - amongst others the obligation in principle to enforce ('beginselplicht tot handhaving') - and reparatory sanctions since the fourth Tranche (2009), which amongst others regulated the execution of administrative reparatory sanctions and added regulation on administrative fines (a punitive sanction). Additionally, more general provisions of administrative law enforcement are discussed. The development of administrative enforcement are reflected against general developments in administrative law, such as harmonization and the increase of litigation. Lastly some bottlenecks will be noticed and solutions proposed.

In the case of Byankov the Court of Justice ruled as follows: EU law must be interpreted as precluding legislation under which an administrative procedure that has resulted in the adoption of a prohibition on leaving the territory, which has become final and has not been contested before the courts, may be reopened - in the event of the prohibition being clearly contrary to EU law - only in circumstances such as those exhaustively listed in Article 99 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, despite the fact that such a prohibition continues to produce legal effects with regard to its addressee. This study discusses how the ruling can be placed in the case law of the Court that in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, EU law does not require that administrative authorities be placed under an obligation to re-examine a national final administrative decision.

The legislator deliberately created a more restrained compensation duty for the legal costs made in the objection procedure, than for the costs made in the appeal procedure. According to article 7:15 of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act, solely the legal costs made in the objection procedure are reimbursed at the request of the stakeholder, as far as the contested decision is revoked by reason of the tort due to the administration. The administration decides on this request when deciding on the objection. There are several disadvantages to this. That is particularly the case, when the stakeholder has lost his interest in the revocation of the contested decision during the procedure, and he solely wants his costs, made in the objection procedure, reimbursed. This raises the question of whether it would be better to regulate the legal costs made in the objection procedure in the same way as the legal costs made in the appeal procedure.

This article examines the impact of the introduction of the Schutznorm-principle (relativiteitsvereiste) in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act on the private enforcement of state aid law. This principle prohibits the administrative courts to annul a decision if the ground manifestly does not protect the complainants interests. Court decisions are examined to research the role of individuals in the private enforcement of state aid law. These individuals often have no competitive relation with the (alleged) beneficiary of the aid. However, presumably the Schutznorm-principle will not hinder them from annulling the decision because the Schutznorm-principle requires clarity regarding the scope of the provision invoked. Article 108 TFEU lacks this clarity. Based on possibilities of appeal against Commissions decisions and case law of the EU CoJ on this matter, the author argues that not every individual needs to be able to invoke state aid provisions.

In its Betfair judgment, the Court of Justice ruled that the exclusive license system with respect to games of chance under Dutch law breaches Article 49 of the EC, now: Article 56 of the TFEU, concerning the free movement of services, and in particular the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency. This article addresses the lessons which can be drawn from this judgement and which Dutch legal concepts could be applied to this 'European' obligation of transparency. According to the judgement, this is not only the case for 'public contracts'and 'concessions', but also to licenses under public law. This article addresses the meaning of these legal concepts and discusses to what extent this 'European' obligation of transparency applies to the relevant Dutch legal concepts.

Soft law is a necessity in modern public administration. On the verge of public bodies that execute administrative tasks various forms of soft law are applied. This article explores the many shapes of soft law in a continental European context. This results in the identification of a series of variables that are relevant for the legal effects of soft law. The article further focuses on the way policy rules, as a special form of soft law, are treated in the Dutch legislation.

In this contribution the history of Dutch administrative law and the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) has been described, with a strong focus on administrative procedures. It sets out the the scope and structure of the act and highlights the main debates on codification of administrative procedure. Finally, it describes the impact of international and European law on Dutch administrative procedures. In conclusion the authors appreciate the uniformity and systematization that the GALA has brought, but place some critical remarks on the strong focus on the procedural side of decision-making, which may be at the expense of the substantive review of orders.

This publication discusses all aspects of causal connection between damages and unlawful governmental decisions.

The case law of the Court of Justice on revoking a national final administrative decision or judgement which is not compliant with EU law can illustrate the existing tension between the principle of primacy on the one hand, and the principle of national procedural autonomy on the other. Although the Court’s choice for one of the two principles as a starting point for solving a collision between EU law and national law may seem arbitrary at first glance, a system may be possible to a certain extent. This study discusses this system, hoping to provide a possible model of explanation which may be applicable to future case law.